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This research shows stereotype activation is controlled by chronic egalitarian goals. In the first 2 studies
it was found that the stereotype of women is equally available to individuals with and without chronic
goals, and the discriminant validity of the concept of egalitarian goals was established. In the next 2
experiments, differences in stereotype activation as a function of this individual difference were found.
In Study 3, participants read attributes following stereotypical primes. Facilitated response times to
stereotypical attributes were found for nonchronics but not for chronics. This lack of facilitation occurred
at stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) where effortful correction processes could not operate, demon-
strating preconscious control of stereotype activation due to chronic goals. In Study 4, inhibition of the
stereotype was found at an SOA where effortful processes of stereotype suppression could not operate.
The data reveal that goals are activated and used preconsciously to prevent stereotype activation,
demonstrating both the controllability of stereotype activation and the implicit role of goals in cognitive
control.
The current research addresses an important question for under-
standing both the nature of stereotyping and the nature of cognitive
control: Can one's commitment to a goal lead to control over the
preconscious stages in which categorization occurs and stereotypes
are activated? Because of the ease with which stereotypes are used
to encode behaviors from and information about members of
stigmatized groups, as well as the often unconscious and implicit
nature of these processes, the answer to this question has been
regarded as "No" (for reviews, see Hamilton & Sherman, 1994;
Stangor & Lange, 1994; Von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas,
1995). Devine (1989, p. 6) referred to a stereotype as "a well-
learned set of associations (Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986) that is
automatically activated. .. this unintentional activation of the
stereotype is equally strong and equally inescapable for high-
and low-prejudice persons." Thus, because "automatic pro-
cesses ... do not require conscious effort" and "a crucial compo-
nent of automatic processes is their inescapability; they occur
despite deliberate attempts to bypass or ignore them" (Devine,
1989, p. 6), stereotype activation has been deemed uncontrollable.
It is our aim to establish that stereotype activation is controlled
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through intent, and that intent operates in a preconscious, resource-
independent fashion. Consistent with Moskowitz and Sussman's
(1999) demonstration that activated goals preconsciously direct
selective, attention and Wegner's (1994) belief that mental control
(with practice) can be automatized, we propose that volition, in the
form of chronic egalitarian goals, leads to the passive and precon-
scious control of stereotype activation. Rather than conceiving of
goals as operating through effort and cognitive control as equiv-
alent with conscious forms of "mental decontamination," it is
proposed that goals intervene at the level of construct activation to
exert passive control.
Devine (1989) described stereotyping with a two-process
dissociation model. The first process is stereotype activation,
and it is seen as automatic and inevitable. The second process
is stereotype application, and it is seen as deliberate and con-
trolled; there is inhibition of the automatically activated stereo-
type and activation of personal beliefs that are counter to the
stereotype. Thus, Devine introduced two distinctions: First,
stereotype activation and stereotype use are separate processes;
second, cultural stereotypes and personal beliefs can be differ-
ent cognitive structures. By pointing out the distinction between
culturally shared stereotypes and personal beliefs, Devine de-
fined a dimension along which individual differences can be
identified. High- versus low-prejudice people differ in a moti-
vational state, where low-prejudiced persons are said to be
motivated to correct and adjust judgments for the impact of
activated stereotypes. Low-prejudice people are characterized
by a large difference between their personal beliefs and the
cultural stereotype, and for these people there is a greater
motivation to correct the automatically activated cultural ste-
reotype. These people can be contrasted with high-prejudiced
persons, who do not try to correct for stereotype use.
167168 MOSKOWITZ. GOLLWITZER. WASEL, AND SCHAAL
Preconscious Control Versus Effortful Correction
(Dissociation)
In making this distinction between high- and low-prejudiced
persons, the focus has been on individual differences in the effort-
ful use of debiasing or correction strategies, in which the low-
prejudiced person deliberately attempts to remove the effects of an
automatically activated stereotype. The dissociation process is said
to be initiated through awareness that one is not meeting some
standard of accuracy and fairness in social judgments (see also
Myrdal's, 1944, discussion of the "American dilemma")- Produc-
ing a stereotype-free response requires that people have either an
explicit motivation to be egalitarian or the phenomenological
experience of feelings such as compunction (Devine, Monteith,
Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991), hypocrisy (Stone, Wiegand, Cooper, &
Aronson, 1997), self-insight (Allport, 1954), or conflict (Myrdal,
1944). If people meet all three criteria of being aware of bias,
being motivated to be nonbiased, and being furnished with cogni-
tive resources to carry out the required mental work, people can
remove the impact of activated stereotypes from final judgments
(e.g., Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Moskowitz et al., 1996; E. P.
Thompson, Roman, Moskowitz, Chaiken, & Bargh, 1994).
However, such correction processes are not infallible in elimi-
nating the effects of stereotypes. The awareness, motivation, and
capacity that correction processes require may be interfered with,
and stereotyping can persist.
1 Because dissociation has a corrective
nature (stereotypic thoughts are removed from final responses),
one may denounce stereotyping but be imperfect in the ability to
live up to what is professed. Unlike the dissociation model, it is
posited here that effortful processes (linked to awareness of bias
and feelings of guilt) are not the only way in which low-prejudice
people remain stereotype-free. Rather, we suggest an additional,
effortless, preconscious form of cognitive control may operate that
determines whether stereotypes are activated to start with. Chronic
egalitarians, whose low-prejudice goals are furnished with strong
commitment, can be distinguished from those who simply articu-
late low-prejudice beliefs without commitment. For chronics, the
egalitarian goal may be habitualized and lead to stereotype control
that is of a preventative, rather than a corrective, nature.
The proposed individual difference in commitment to the goal
of being egalitarian, fair, tolerant, and open-minded allows for an
extension of (and modification to) the dissociation model so that
(a) stereotype activation need not be conceived of as inevitable,
and (b) stereotype control need not be conceived of as effortful and
linked to one's awareness of bias and the experience of feelings
such as compunction. Holding a chronic egalitarian goal can lead
one to strive repeatedly for attainment of the goal, and it can lead
to activation of the goal whenever a goal-relevant person is en-
countered. Thus, the goal of being egalitarian would operate pre-
consciously—it need not require awareness or effort.
Goal Influences on Stereotype Activation: Auto-Motives
and Chronic Goals
Social-cognitive research suggests that not only trait categories
and stereotypes but goals can be automatically activated in the
early, inferential stages of person perception. Persistence in pursuit
of a goal over time can lead to that goal being chronically acces-
sible. According to Bargh (1990), goals become chronically ac-
cessible through their frequent and committed pursuit. Despite the
fact that goal strivings stem from an initial conscious goal inten-
tion, the repeated pairing of a goal with a set of situations leads to
the eventual movement of goal pursuit from consciousness—the
goal would become chronically accessible, and this heightened
accessibility would mean that the activation of the goal would no
longer require the conscious intent to link goal striving to an
environmental stimulus. Rather, the goal would be activated when
appropriate environmental features are encountered (Bargh &
Gollwitzer, 1994), with the goal's activation being preconscious.
Thus, goals are knowledge structures (Bargh, 1990; Kruglanski,
1996) and, like other knowledge structures, can be unconsciously
activated (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Chai, & Barndollar, 1998; Chartrand
& Bargh, 1996). As with knowledge structures, the greater the
accessibility of the category, the less input required for the cate-
gory to be activated (Bruner, 1957). Once activated, a construct
(either a semantic or a goal construct) should be capable of
capturing relevant stimuli and determining the nature of categori-
zation (e.g., Bruner, 1957; Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Mos-
kowitz & Skurnik, 1999).
Bargh (1990) termed goals that are activated by an environmen-
tal stimulus auto-motives. This is similar to Ach's (1935) belief
that an intention that was repeatedly carried out in a particular
situation becomes automatically activated whenever this situation
is encountered. Self-regulation thus is not only a matter of con-
sciousness but is also contributed to by preconscious processes
(see also Bargh, 1997). If the auto-motive model is applied to
stereotype activation, persons holding a chronic goal to be egali-
tarian toward a particular group could unconsciously have an
egalitarian goal activated when they perceive a member of this
group. The activation of stereotypes that might occur for people
without an egalitarian goal would be controlled by persons with
chronic goals. In such cases, nonstereotypic, stimulus-relevant,
semantic categories (e.g., doctor, cyclist, janitor, etc.) and goals
could be more dominant than the stereotype and serve to capture
the stimulus.
2 This activation would be nonconscious and effective
because of the increased accessibility that results from a long
history of repeated activation.
The fact that some individuals can control stereotype activation
does not mean we are implying that stereotyping is not passive.
However, the lack of awareness of a process such as stereotype
activation does not mean that it cannot be controlled through
1 For example, one may shield insight from reaching consciousness to
prevent the experience of guilt; goals other than egalitarianism may pre-
dominate; the press of the situation may prevent one from working toward
bias-free responses; given a lack of commitment to egalitarianism, obsta-
cles to goal pursuit may lead one to disengage from the pursuit of bias-free
responses and to rationalize, rather than correct, stereotypes.
2 We do not mean to imply here that the only way to become egalitarian
is to overcome socialization experiences. The possibility that egalitarian
societies may exist or that egalitarian families may shelter children from
societal forces and raise them according to principles of egalitarianism is
not discounted. It is simply noted that most cultures socialize children with
notions of in-group and out-group and that goals can lead these experiences
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intent/' Despite the fact that the English language vernacular
equates intent with conscious and effortful forms of pursuing a
desired end state, volition can be exerted preconsciously. A pas-
sive process like stereotype activation could be controlled by goal
pursuit, which could be activated as passively as stereotype
activation.
Bargh (1989, 1994) has distinguished between varieties of au-
tomaticity in cognitive processing, ranging from the preconscious
(characterized by a lack of awareness of the instigating stimuli, the
lack of a specific goal initiating the process, attentional resources
not being required, and the inability to control the processes from
occurring) to the intended. Stereotype activation has generally
been regarded as an exemplar of preconscious automaticity. The
nontrivial implication that arises from that classification is it
means stereotype activation cannot be prevented; the only route to
controlling stereotyping is to prevent stereotype use after activa-
tion. If stereotype activation was instead categorized as a goal-
dependent form of automaticity, it could still be described as
operating without awareness or intent, but we would be forced to
add notions of its controllability. This would suggest additional
ways to control the effects of stereotypes, such as controlling
stereotype activation.
Assessing Chronic Egalitarian Goals Through
Self-Completion Strivings
In past research, experimenters asserting stereotype activation is
inescapable labeled people as high and low in prejudice on the
basis of self-reports from attitude scales (e.g., the Modern Racism
Scale; McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981). However, such mea-
sures assess beliefs, not motivation. Our intent was to examine not
prejudiced beliefs but chronic goal orientations. This was done
using a procedure developed from the logic of symbolic self-
completion theory. Wicklund and Gollwitzer (1982; Brunstein &
Gollwitzer, 1996; Gollwitzer & Wicklund, 1985; Gollwitzer &
Kirchhof, 1998) posited that people conceive of aspects of the self
in terms of goals. Not only do people think of themselves as
possessing certain attributes (e.g., holding the self-concept of
being smart, socially sensitive, or egalitarian with respect to mem-
bers of certain groups) to a smaller or larger degree; rather, they
also set the goal of becoming smart, socially sensitive, or egali-
tarian. If people commit themselves to such self-defining goals,
they are expected to make use of available opportunities to express
the goal and to hold on to it even in the face of hindrances, barriers,
and difficulties. Failure to see oneself as possessing the attributes
of the aspired-to identity leads to feelings of incompleteness, an
aversive self-evaluative state. People try to alleviate this state by
seeking evidence that they possess the desired attributes—they
strive to possess symbols of self-completion (e.g., Gollwitzer,
Wicklund, & Hilton, 1982). When one fails to attain the desired
goal state, or acts in a manner inconsistent with the goal, striving
for symbols of self-completion can be achieved through compen-
satory acts. Thus, one persists in goal pursuit in the face of failure
in an attempt to use subsequent behavior to compensate for one's
shortcomings. Expressed in Lewin's (1936) terms, experiencing
failure strengthens the tension to attain the goal, leading to in-
creased effort to compensate for having violated the goal.
The compensation principle of self-completion theory suggests
an efficient, implicit assessment procedure for self-defining goals.
If one wants to know whether a person holds a certain self-defining
goal, one only has to inflict a relevant incompleteness experience
on that person and observe whether the person responds with
respective compensatory efforts. Accordingly, to determine
whether our research participants were committed to the self-
defining goal of judging women in a fair and egalitarian manner,
we first forced them to make stereotypic judgments of women and
then observed them to see if compensatory behavior (increased
egalitarianism) was displayed. If such behaviors were displayed it
would indicate that those participants had felt incomplete, suggest-
ing a committed, self-defining goal had been present and was
violated. For these individuals stereotype control should be possi-
ble not merely through a strategy of correcting for the use of a
stereotype or suppressing the stereotype after it is activated but
through preconscious control; they should be able to control the
activation of a stereotype despite the presence of a stereotype-
relevant stimulus.
Study 1: Knowledge of Cultural Stereotypes
and Chronic Egalitarian Goals
Our goal in this line of research is to establish that individual
differences in commitment to egalitarian goals determine whether
stereotype activation can be controlled. The first step is to establish
that people with high commitment (chronics) and low commitment
(nonchronics) to egalitarian goals can be identified. The next step
is to show that each type of person has knowledge of the cultural
stereotype. The reason for this is to establish that any differences
between chronics and nonchronics in stereotype activation cannot
be attributed to differences in availability (e.g., Higgins, 1996) of
the stereotype. Such differences in availability, or a priori knowl-
edge of the stereotype, would serve as an alternative explanation to
our assertion that where these two groups differ is in their activa-
tion of the stereotype in response to a stereotype-relevant stimulus.
Thus, in Study 1 we demonstrate that chronics and nonchronics
can be identified and that each group has knowledge of the
stereotype, which in this case is the cultural stereotype of women.
Method
Research Participants
Fifty-three male students at the University of Konstanz participated in
the two phases of Study 1. Twenty-five were chronics and 28 were
nonchronics (see below for criteria used to determine chronicity) with
3 Even consciously adopted goal intentions can interfere with passive
processes. This occurs in two ways. First, it occurs when one intends to
disrupt the passive process, such as when one adopts a goal to be non-
prejudiced in order to control stereotype activation (e.g., Gollwitzer,
Schaal, Moskowitz, Hammelbeck, & Wasel, 1999). Second, it occurs when
one intends to implement one goal and this results in the unintended
consequence of controlling a passive process that would have otherwise
occurred. For example, Uleman and Moskowitz (1994) showed that goals
to attend to letter strings in a sentence prevented the unconscious activation
of trait categories that normally are inferred when reading such sentences.
We extend this logic by saying that the unconscious activation of stereo-
typic trait categories can be controlled by either of these two routes through
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regard to the goal of egalitarianism toward women. Participants received
DM 10 ($7) for their participation.
Procedure
Research participants were run in groups of 3-6. There were two phases
to the study. In the first phase the degree of commitment to egalitarian
goals (chronic egalitarianism toward women) was assessed. The egalitar-
ianism assessment task was made up of several parts. First, participants
rated four groups on semantic differential scales. Following a distractor
task, participants next completed a questionnaire designed to induce an
experience of incompleteness for people committed to egalitarianism (fail-
ing to live up to a standard of being egalitarian to women by forcing
participants to give stereotypic responses). Next, participants were again
asked to rate the groups on the semantic differential, ostensibly because we
were interested in whether judgments were stable across time. In actuality
we were interested in identifying chronics by signs of compensatory
behavior in their ratings of women. This phase of the research was
described as a pretest for a departmental project in which professors from
the different areas of psychology (social, motivational, cognitive, etc.)
were exploring themes that would be of interest to students. The second
phase of Study 1 was used to assess knowledge of cultural stereotypes of
women (similar to the procedure used by Devine, 1989). Participants were
asked to list the content of the cultural stereotype of women while disre-
garding their own personal beliefs regarding the validity of the stereotype.
Materials
Knowledge of the cultural stereotype. Participants were instructed to
list the content of the cultural stereotype of women, disregarding their own
beliefs. They were told, "We are not interested in your own beliefs about
women; we only want to know about those notions that are represented in
societal beliefs." Responses were open-ended; participants had 10 min to
record them.
Semantic differential scales. Participants were asked to indicate their
personal beliefs about all 4 groups through trait ratings, using a 12-point
semantic differential. There were four groups (women, men, workers,
academics) and 17 semantic differential scales for each group (see Eckes,
1994), with 12 of these scales being stereotype relevant for the scale
assessing women. Higher scores indicated greater stereotype use.
Inducing incompleteness and measuring egalitarian goals. Incom-
pleteness was induced by a multiple-choice test forcing participants to
respond in stereotypical ways; all answers involved invoking a stereotype
about women. The test included five stereotype-related situations (e.g., "A
couple with a baby decides the mother will quit work and care for the
child"). For each situation there were three stereotypical explanations to
choose from, and participants were asked to mark the one that seemed most
reasonable to them. For this example, these were
(a) Women are more likely to create a warm emotional atmosphere
and build a close relationship with the child.
(b) Women are talkative and able to communicate with others about
feelings. This makes them more understanding.
(c) Women are more sensitive and caring in their relationship with
children.
Nonchronics would not violate a committed goal by answering these
questions and should not experience a sense of incompleteness, and,
therefore, they should not display compensatory behaviors. However,
inflicting failure on chronics with respect to meeting their egalitarian goal
(by forcing them to give stereotypical answers) should lead chronics to
experience a sense of incompleteness and to give subsequent compensatory
responses. Compensatory behavior is measured by semantic differential
ratings; chronics should be especially nonstereotypical on the second
testing of the semantic differential (relative to their prior responses) be-
cause they are striving to compensate for the experienced incompleteness
arising from having violated a chronic goal.
Results
Participants were classified as chronics and nonchronics on the
basis of whether they displayed compensatory behavior in re-
sponse to being forced to act stereotypically toward women. This
was computed by summing the ratings concerning judgments of
women for the first semantic differential and then summing the
ratings for the second semantic differential. Difference scores were
computed by subtracting the sum of the first (Time 1) from the
sum of the second (Time 2) testing of the semantic differential.
Persons whose means on the Time 1 and Time 2 semantic differ-
entials were not in the upper third of the rating scale (because
responses in the upper third are highly stereotypical) and who
displayed negative differences between Time 2 and Time 1 (be-
coming less stereotypical) were labeled egalitarian. These persons
tried to compensate after induced incompleteness (through giving
less stereotypical responses to the second semantic differential
than to the first one), and their responses were not at the stereo-
typical end of the scale. In contrast, persons with a 0 or positive
difference score were labeled nonchronics because they did not try
to compensate and, therefore, failed to show evidence of experi-
encing incompleteness.
Two judges, blind to participants' chronicity level, coded the
free responses to the cultural-stereotype-assessment task. The
judges achieved an agreement level of 80% on their classifications
of the responses (K = .75). Table 1 shows the proportion of
chronics and nonchronics who listed relevant attributes in their
free responses, with at least 30% consensus on an attribute. The
important point to highlight is that there was not one reliable
difference between chronics and nonchronics along any of the
attribute categories (ps > .20). Responses in general are best
described as being equally held between chronics and nonchronics.
The findings demonstrate that nonchronics do not have more
knowledge of the cultural stereotype or have stereotypes of women
more available to them. This suggests that any differences between
chronics and nonchronics in stereotype activation cannot be con-
strued as occurring because of a process whereby (a) the knowl-
Table 1
Percentage of People Listing Stereotypical Traits
in Their Free Responses
Trait
Sexy/pretty
Unassertive
Tender/caring
Fickle
Irrational
Zickig*
Sensitive/empathic
Dependent
Emotional
Chronic participants
84
64
56
52
50
48
41
37
33
Nonchronic participants
87
67
47
41
44
57
50
44
33
a Zickig is a German word that has no direct translation in English. It is a
slang word that encompasses traits such as talking loudly and frequently
and acting crazy in an hysterical manner. It is a word used to describe a
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edge structures in chronics are less available (because they never
learned the stereotype as well as nonchronics) or (b) the knowl-
edge structures of chronics have atrophied, cognitively speaking,
because of lack of use and the repeated suppression of their
content.
Study 2: The Nomological Standing of the Chronic
Fairness Goal Concept
Chronic egalitarian goals have been defined here as the self-
defining goal of producing fair and nonstereotypical judgments of
women. People were labeled chronics if they experienced a sense
of incompleteness when forced to act in a stereotypical manner
toward the specified group. However, it remains possible that the
act of making a prejudiced judgment in general is what caused
incompleteness, and that what we have chosen to label as a specific
goal is really a somewhat general measure of a desire to not be
prejudiced.
The goal of the second study was to establish the distinctiveness
of the concept of chronic egalitarianism from other relevant indi-
vidual difference constructs. It is important to establish that people
we identify as having controlled stereotype activation that is due to
chronic fairness goals directed toward women can be differentiated
from people who differ in masculinity ratings (assessed by the
Freiburg Personality Inventory; FPI; Schenk, Rausche, & Steege,
1977), people who control the use of stereotypes by acting on
feelings of compunction arising from having acted in a stereotyp-
ical way, people who report that they are low in prejudice on
measures that assess stereotypical beliefs, and people who have
global cognitive and motivational styles that might predispose
them to avoid stereotypical thoughts (low need for structure, high
need for cognition). Our theoretical assumption is that what is
assessed by the procedure used in Study 1 is a commitment to the
goal of judging women fairly and nonstereotypically and not other
personal attributes that might be relevant to the activation of the
female stereotype. In Study 1 we established that chronics are not
differentiated from nonchronics in their knowledge of the cultural
stereotype. In Study 2 we investigate whether chronics differ from
nonchronics along a series of individual difference measures that
could potentially be construed as accounting for differences in
stereotype activation and use.
Method
Research Participants
Forty-six male students at the University of Konstanz participated in
exchange for DM 10 ($7). Twenty-two participants were nonchronic
and 24 were chronic egalitarians.
Procedure
Participants, in groups of 5-10 persons, were asked to fill out a packet
of questionnaires. The packet began with a set of demographic questions
that was then followed by a series of individual difference scales. The
scales were, in order, the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI; Glick &
Fiske, 1996), the Modern Sexism Scale (MSS; Swim and Cohen, 1997), the
Personal Need for Structure Scale (PNS; M. M. Thompson, Naccarato, &
Parker, in press), the Need for Cognition Scale (NFC; Cacioppo, Petty,
Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996), the personal Need for Closure Scale (NFCS;
Kruglanski & Webster, 1994), the FPI (Schenk, Rausche, & Steege, 1977),
the measure for assessing chronic fairness goals toward women used in
Study 1 (semantic differential scales, followed by a multiple-choice test
that forces stereotypic responses, followed by another set of responses to
the semantic differential scales), and finally a measure of affect.
Materials
Semantic differential scales. These scales were the same as those used
in Study 1.
Inducing incompleteness and measuring egalitarian goals. Egalitari-
anism was defined as in Study 1, with classification dependent on com-
mitment to the goal of fairness to women.
Affect measure. Participants were asked to respond to a set of affective
measures to rule out the possibility that chronics will have lingering
negative emotional reactions after having been led to give stereotypical
responses. In particular, we were interested in establishing that feelings of
compunction and guilt, which have been shown in prior research to lead
people to produce stereotype-free responses, are not what is motivating
chronic egalitarians in our research. Having the opportunity to strive
toward completeness on the second round of the semantic differential
questionnaire should alleviate any feelings of guilt or negative emotions
that chronics might have experienced. If guilt or negative emotions are
alleviated after the participants take the second semantic differential ques-
tionnaire, those emotions cannot qualify as alternative causes of control
over stereotype activation. The affective measures used were borrowed
from those utilized by Devine et al. (1991).
Results
The purpose of this study was to demonstrate that chronics and
nonchronics do not differ along a set of individual difference and
affective variables that could potentially be used to explain differ-
ences in stereotype activation and use. Instead, chronic egalitarians
are said to be distinctive because of their commitment to a goal and
the experience of a sense of incompleteness when that goal is
violated. If this is correct we should find no differences between
chronics and nonchronics along affective measures, because
chronics should no longer experience a sense of incompleteness
once compensation has occurred. Having had the opportunity to
compensate for the negative emotions triggered by our manipula-
tions, chromes should be similar to nonchronics in their emotions.
If, however, negative affect from the manipulations lingers in
chronics (or if an a priori difference in guilt is what characterizes
chronics) and drives their responses on measures that assess ste-
reotype activation and use, then chronics and nonchronics would
differ in their emotional responses. The results (see Table 2) re-
veal that chronics and nonchronics do not differ in levels of
guilt, discomfort, threat, negativity toward others, or depression
(ps > .20).
Additionally, if chronics are simply reflecting a general ten-
dency to be low in prejudice, then chronics should differ from
nonchronics in responses to scales that assess prejudice by tapping
stereotypical beliefs (e.g., the Modern Racism Scale in past re-
search). In the current study we examined sexism, so stereotypical
beliefs were assessed through the ASI and MSS. We did not expect
chronics to be different from nonchronics in terms of their attitudes
toward women as assessed by scales such as the ASI or the MSS.
Rather, they should only differ in terms of their commitment to the
goal to be fair to women and, thus, their readiness to act on this
goal when it is activated. Consistent with this interpretation and
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Table 2
Personality, Affective, Motivational, and Prejudicial Responses
as a Function of Chronicity
Individual-difference measure
Affective response
Negative other
Positive self
Guilt
Anxiety
Depression
Threat
Ambivalent Sexism Inventory
Modern Sexism Scale
Personal Need for Structure
Need for Closure
Need for Cognition
Freiburg Personality Inventory
Extroversion
Masculinity
Neuroticism
Chronic
14.7
22.9
55.2
54.3
11.1
11.0
87.1
35.4
47.1
171.9
81.4
3.2
3.2
3.7
Chronicity
Nonchronic
17.0
20.3
51.1
48.9
11.5
11.5
86.5
37.4
45.2
167.8
82.7
3.1
3.7
3.6
Note. The range of individual items in each of the measures, except the
Freiburg Personality Inventory, is from 1 to 7. The negative other measure
of affect comprises three items, and scores range from 3 to 21; the positive
self measure of affect comprises 6 items, and scores range from 6 to 42; the
guilt and anxiety measures of affect comprise 9 items, and scores range
from 9 to 63; the depression and threat measures of affect comprise 2 items,
and scores range from 2 to 14; the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory has 22
items, and scores range from 22 to 154; the Modern Sexism Scale has 8
items, and scores range from 8 to 56; the Personal Need for Structure
measure has 12 items, and scores range from 12 to 84; the Need for Closure
measure has 18 items, and scores range from 18 to 126; the Need for
Cognition measure has 42 items, and scores range from 42 to 294. The
Freiburg Personality Inventory consists of dichotomous items (0 = agree,
1 = disagree).
prejudice generally" than nonchronics, there were no reliable dif-
ferences between chronics and nonchronics on either the ASI or
the MSS (ps > .30).
Moreover, the motivational profile of chronics and nonchronics
did not reliably differ in their scores on the PNS, NFC, or NFCS
(ps > .37). Finally, chronics and nonchronics did not reliably
differ in their responses to the three dimensions (neuroticism,
masculinity, extroversion) of the FPI (ps > .30). In summary, we
find no reliable differences between chronics and nonchronics on
any dimension other than their display of compensatory behavior
on the semantic differential. On the basis of these results we
conclude that chronics are distinctly different from nonchronics
because of their commitment to an egalitarian goal to be fair to
women and not because of general levels of prejudice, affective
reactions, or global motivational and cognitive styles.
4
Study 3: Controlling the "Uncontrollable"—Chronic
Fairness Goals Prevent Stereotype Activation
Having established that we can identify a group of chronic
egalitarians who know the cultural stereotype as well as nonchron-
ics and who do not differ from nonchronics in general levels of
prejudicial attitudes, we can examine whether chronics' commit-
ment to their goal enables them to control stereotype activation.
Such a demonstration would allow us to distinguish this prevention
of stereotype activation from previous models of stereotype con-
trol that describe the process of stereotype control as one of
dissociation or debiasing due to motivated efforts to correct one's
judgments (effortfully) after stereotype activation. To demonstrate
the effortless nature of control over stereotype activation, precau-
tions were taken in the current experiment to avoid the possibility
that conscious processes of suppression or dissociation could ac-
count for the findings. First, an implicit measure of stereotype
activation—word pronunciation following primes—was used to
avoid the possibility that participants would be aware of attempts
to control stereotypes. Second, the responses were called for at an
interval after the presentation of the prime too short to allow
4 Several reviewers of this manuscript questioned why we had not used
the more established method of assessing chronicity used by Bargh and
colleagues (e.g., Bargh & Tota, 1988). The reason was that the current
research is investigating chronic goal orientations, whereas past research
assessing chronically accessible constructs has focused on semantic con-
struct accessibility, not goal accessibility. It was decided, instead, to
develop a new method for assessing chronic goals that draws from the
literature on motivation and goal pursuit rather than to use a method
designed to assess a different type of construct accessibility. However, the
reviewer's intuitions that chronic goal orientations could be assessed by a
task similar to that used by Bargh and Tota (1988) seemed reasonable, and
it also seemed like a fine method for demonstrating the convergent validity
of our self-completion method of assessing chronic goals. To investigate
this issue, we conducted a test of convergent validity that examined the
relationship between the compensation measure used in the experiments in
this article and an open-ended assessment task that paralleled the types of
procedures that have been used to assess chronically accessible semantic
constructs. Forty-one participants completed two separate phases of this
study. In one phase they completed a series of semantic differential scales
followed by a multiple-choice test that forced them to give stereotypic
responses; they then completed the semantic differential scales again (the
procedure used for assessing chronicity in all the studies reported in this
article). Positive and negative change scores determined whether they had
compensated. In a second phase, participants filled out an open-ended
goal-assessment form patterned after that used by Higgins (1989) to assess
self-discrepancy. It asked, "Take a few minutes to briefly describe your
current hopes and goals. Please include a description of how your hopes
and goals differ from those you had while growing up." Responses were
then coded for mentions of egalitarian themes toward the group in question.
Of the 41 participants, 30 were classified as nonchronics on the basis of the
compensation measure (failure to be incomplete following the stereotypical
task); 11 were classified as chronics. Of the 41 participants, only 7
spontaneously mentioned egalitarian themes toward the specified group in
their descriptions of their hopes and goals (not unusually small, given that
the task was unrelated to stereotyping, and these responses were simply
spontaneously mentioned by the participant without being solicited in any
way). Of the people who spontaneously mentioned egalitarian themes, 71%
of them were people labeled chronics on the basis of the compensation
measure. Of the 30 people who did not attempt to compensate (no incom-
pleteness demonstrated), only 2 (7%) spontaneously mentioned egalitarian
themes when describing their goals; in contrast, 5 out of the 11 people who
compensated (46%) spontaneously mentioned egalitarian themes when
describing their goals, ^(40, N = 41) = 8.5, p < .01. The conclusion is
that the compensation measure seemed to be identifying people who have
chronically accessible egalitarian goals. This is evidenced by the fact that
people who display compensatory behavior are much more likely, without
being provoked or prompted (in that the task did not mention stereotyping
or egalitarianism), to be people who list egalitarian goals toward the
specific group on an open-ended, goal-assessment task.PRECONSCIOUS CONTROL OF STEREOTYPE ACTIVATION 173
conscious processes to operate. Third, participants fully attended
to the primes, so that control, although shown not to be due to
conscious suppression by the first two precautions, cannot be,
alternatively, attributed to divided attention.
In Study 3, evidence that observing a stereotype-relevant target
need not activate the stereotype for that group was sought by using
a reaction time measure that assessed control at speeds (e.g., 200
ms) where it is known (Bargh, 1997; Neely, 1977) that conscious
control is not possible. If chronics show no activation of stereo-
types at such speeds, we have evidence that stereotype activation
was controlled for by these individuals. It also suggests that such
activation is due to the preconscious use of volition—chronic
egalitarian goals promote implicit control over stereotype activa-
tion. In the experiment, faces of women were presented as primes.
Categorizing these primes with the label woman might serve to
activate the stereotype for women, but, as our model suggests, it
might not. If stereotypes are accessible, then there should be a
facilitation (greater ease of responding) for participants on a sub-
sequent word pronunciation task, but only when the words to be
pronounced are relevant to the stereotype. If stereotypes are not
inevitably activated, but goal dependent, there should not be a
facilitation in pronouncing stereotype-relevant words. Despite be-
ing primed by female faces, chronics should not have their re-
sponse times facilitated by primes.
Priming paradigms are classic procedures for researching auto-
matic processes (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Fa-
zio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Meyer & Schvane-
veldt, 1971; Neely, 1977). The paradigm stipulates that conscious
control is possible only after 600 ms have elapsed between the
presentation of a prime and a stimulus (what is called a stimulus
onset asynchrony, or SOA). Processing occurring within an SOA
of 600 ms cannot be consciously controlled. Thus, automatic
activation and preconscious control can be evidenced by examin-
ing responses at an SOA of 200 ms. If control is only possible
through the effortful process of correction, then chronics and
nonchronics would not differ in their response latencies when the
SOA was 200 ms: Chronics would show the facilitation of re-
sponse times that nonchronics exhibit. However, chronics and
nonchronics would differ at an SOA of 1,500 ms, a time frame in
which effortful control could be used. If stereotype activation was
prevented, stereotype-relevant primes would be unable to facilitate
response times at both 200- and 1,500-ms SOAs.
Method
Design and Overview
The experiment proceeded in two phases. In the first phase participants
were categorized as to whether they had a chronic goal for being fair to
women (chronic egalitarians). In the second phase, those with and without
chronic fairness goals to women participated in a pronunciation experi-
ment. The research participants saw photographs of men or women fol-
lowed by an attribute. Their task was to pronounce this attribute as fast as
possible. The attributes were either consistent with or irrelevant to the
stereotype of women and were presented at either short (200 ms) or long
(1,500 ms) SOAs. Thus, there were two between-participant factors—SOA
(short, long) and chronicity (chronics, nonchronics)—and there were two
within-participant factors—prime (men, women in photographs) and target
attributes (stereotype-consistent, stereotype-irrelevant). The dependent
variable was the reaction time from the moment the trait was presented to
the moment the participants began to pronounce the attribute (response
latency).
Research Participants
Seventy-eight male students at the University of Konstanz, selected on
the basis of chronicity scores from Phase 1, participated in Phase 2 of the
experiment (41 chronics and 37 nonchronics) for DM 15 ($10).
Procedure
In this first phase of the experiment (Phase 1) participants' chronic
fairness goals toward women were assessed (as in Study 1). Phase 2
occurred 2 weeks later. Participants worked individually and were told they
would see a series of (162) photographs of famous and nonfamous persons
presented on a computer monitor; after each picture they would see an
attribute. Of the 108 photographs of nonfamous people, 54 were of women
and 54 were of men. The remaining 54 photographs were of famous
people, 27 women and 27 men. Each of 18 female stereotypical at-
tributes, 18 male stereotypical attributes, and 18 neutral attributes were
paired once with a photograph of a nonfamous man, a nonfamous woman,
and a famous person. The task was to pronounce each attribute as quickly
as possible. The dependent variable was response latency. After all 162
pairings of attributes and pictures had been presented, research participants
were debriefed.
Chronicity measure. Chronicity was measured exactly as it was in
Study 1.
The pronunciation task. Research participants were exposed to a prime
(a photograph of a person) followed by an attribute (personal trait). They
had to pronounce the attribute as quickly as possible. Participants were told
this task was being used to examine whether pictures of famous persons
influence reading ability. The photographs (54 nonfamous men, 54 non-
famous women, and 54 famous persons) were either presented for 200 ms
and followed immediately by attributes (SOA of 200 ms) or presented for
200 ms and followed by attributes 1,300 ms later (SOA of 1,500 ms). The
first 10 trials were exercise trials to reduce response latency variance
(Fazio, 1990). There were 172 trials total per participant, and attributes
were randomly paired with pictures. The experimenter was blind to
whether participants held chronic fairness goals.
Primes. The primes were photographs of nonfamous men, nonfamous
women, and famous persons (e.g., Formula One champion Michael Schu-
macher, tennis player Boris Becker). All pictures were black-and-white
photographs (to diminish color attention effects) from magazines, dis-
played in a passport format, in the center of the monitor and at a uniform
size (9X7 cm). The persons depicted were selected using the criterion that
no attention-grabbing ornaments, glasses, hats, or clothes could be visible.
Target attributes. Six stereotypical traits for women were selected.
Stereotypical attributes were determined on the basis of a pretest in
which 60 students (who did not participate in the current experiment) were
asked to check off stereotypical traits for women and men from a list
provided for them (that was based on the attributes generated in Study 1).
The 6 attributes most frequently used to describe women and never (or only
once) used to describe men were used for the stereotypical attributes. These
attributes, and the percentage of pretest participants who endorsed them,
were (translated from German) sexy (88%), loving (68%), sensitive (67%),
irrational (65%), deceptive or cunning (58%), weak or dependent (58%).
For each trait, two synonyms were generated. This resulted in 18 female
attributes. The 18 nonstereotypical attributes consisted of attributes never
used to describe women and never or only once used to describe men
(translated from German: colorful, sociable, flexible, fair, easygoing, op-
timistic, kind, reliable, just, humorless, rotten, self-critical arrogant,
lonely, impatient, inhibited, stubborn and creepy).
Apparatus. The pronunciation task was presented on a Compaq DX66
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delay. Response latency was measured by research participants' speaking
into a headset microphone, thus keeping distance to the microphone con-
stant. The program was written in Turbo Pascal 7.0 (Hewitt, 1993).
Results
Stereotype activation in this experiment is evidenced by a
Prime X Target interaction for response latencies such that
stereotype-relevant primes (photographs of women) lead to faster
responses to stereotype-relevant attributes than when these same
attributes are pronounced following nonstereotypic primes (but no
such facilitation should be found for stereotype-irrelevant at-
tributes). Stereotype control is revealed when response latencies
are not faster following stereotype-relevant (versus stereotype-
irrelevant) primes for either stereotype-relevant or stereotype-
irrelevant attributes (no Prime X Target interaction). Nonchronics
should reveal a stereotype activation pattern; chronics should not.
Also, control exhibited by chronics is not consciously exerted to
correct an activated stereotype. Control at an SO A of 1,500 ms
could be effortful, but at an SOA of 200 ms it could not. Thus, a
relative response latency advantage (for stereotype-relevant at-
tributes only) for nonchronics versus chronics following
stereotype-relevant primes at 200 ms would indicate control of
stereotype activation for the chronics.
Outliers and Suspicion Probes
Suspicion regarding a contingency between the two experi-
ments. No participants were excluded because of suspicion.
Outliers and word length effects. Response times were ana-
lyzed for extreme outliers. Response latencies more than 3 stan-
dard deviations above and below the mean in each category (e.g.,
prime = female, target = female, chronicity = chronic, SOA =
short) were excluded; 1.9% in = 166) of the response times were
omitted. No category had more than 4% of the data omitted.
There was a significant correlation between word length and
response latency (r = .37, p < .05). However, there were not any
reliable differences between word lengths in any of the categories,
F(2, 46) = 1.16, p > .20, so that the correlation between word
length and response latency did not affect the Prime X Chronic-
ity X SOA analysis of variance (ANOVA; see below). The cor-
relation between word frequency and response latency was low
and not significant (r = -.17, p = .39).
Chronic Goals and Response Latency
Chronic egalitarians should show a pattern of responses that
demonstrates control over stereotype activation; nonchronics
should show a pattern of responses in support of stereotype acti-
vation. Therefore, within each SOA condition a Prime X Target X
Chronicity interaction is predicted. Although the same pattern
should be found at both long and short SOAs, only responses from
the short SOA condition can be used as evidence for control over
activation.
As predicted, a significant Prime X Target X Chronicity inter-
action was found for the short-SOA condition, F(l, 38) = 6.13,
p < .02. The Prime X Target interaction for nonchronics showed
a significant activation pattern, F(l, 16) = 16.87, p < .01.
Stereotype-relevant target attributes following stereotypical primes
(M — 504 ms) were pronounced more quickly than stereotype-
relevant target attributes following stereotype-irrelevant primes
(M = 530 ms), r(16) = -5.94, p < .01 (see Table 3). No such
facilitation was found for stereotype-irrelevant attributes following
stereotype-relevant (M = 526 ms) versus stereotype-irrelevant
(M = 526 ms) primes, ?(16) = -0.03, p = .99. As predicted, the
Prime X Target interaction for chronics was not reliable, F( 1, 18)
= .50, p = .49. Stereotype-relevant attributes following stereotyp-
ical primes (M = 554 ms) were not facilitated relative to the same
target attributes following stereotype-irrelevant primes (M = 556
ms), /(18) = —1.17,/? = .26. Similarly, no differences were found
for stereotype-irrelevant targets following either prime type, *(18)
= -0.44, p = .67 (see Table 3).
The long-SOA condition showed a similar pattern. The pre-
dicted Prime X Target X Chronicity interaction was significant,
F(l, 36) = 21.75, p < .05. The Prime X Target interaction for
nonchronics showed a reliable activation pattern, F(l, 19)
= 20.83, p < .01. Nonchronics pronounced stereotype-relevant
words more quickly after seeing photos of female (M = 535 ms)
versus male (M = 560 ms) faces, t( 19) = -437,p< .01,and did
not differ in their responses to stereotype-irrelevant words as a
function of prime type, t(l9) - -0.97, p = .35; see Table 4. For
chronics in the long-SOA condition, the control pattern exhibited
at 200 ms was strengthened by the increased time interval such that
active suppression of stereotypical responses seemed to be evi-
denced, indicated by a reliable Prime X Target interaction, F(l,
17) = 4.32, p = .05. Stereotype-relevant words following stereo-
typical primes were pronounced more slowly (M = 606 ms) than
were stereotype-relevant words following stereotype-irrelevant
primes (M = 600 ms), although this difference was not reli-
able. Finally, responses to stereotype-irrelevant attributes did not
reliably differ following stereotype-relevant versus stereotype-
irrelevant primes (see Table 4).
Discussion
The results of Study 3 demonstrate that stereotype activation is
goal dependent. Participants with chronic goals failed to show the
classic effect of a response time facilitation for category-relevant
items after the presentation of a category-relevant priming stimu-
lus. Research participants primed with photos of female faces
should respond more quickly to stereotype-relevant attributes if the
face serves to prime the stereotype. This held true for nonchronics
but not for chronic egalitarians, suggesting that stereotypes had not
Table 3
Response Times (in ms) to Target Attributes at Short (200 ms)
Stimulus Onset Asynchrony in Experiment 3
Attribute type
Stereotypical
Irrelevant
Stereotypical
Irrelevant
Prime type
Stereotypical
Nonchronic participants
504
526
Chronic participants
554
542
Irrelevant
530
526
556
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Table 4
Response Time (in ms) to Target Attributes at Long (1,500 ms)
Stimulus Onset Asynchrony in Experiment 3
Attribute type
Stereotypical
Irrelevant
Stereotypical
Irrelevant
Prime type
Stereotypical
Nonchronic participants
535
546
Chronic participants
606
578
Irrelevant
560
549
600
583
been activated for chronics. This could not be due to conscious
goals exerted on the part of chronics because the difference be-
tween chronics and nonchronics was exhibited at an SOA of only
200 ms. Thus, stereotype activation is shown to be goal-dependent,
controllable by an implicit and preconsciously operating goal.
Additionally, the responses of chronics at the longer time interval
(a 1,500-ms SOA) revealed attempts to actively suppress the
stereotype. In the next study we examine whether the inhibition of
stereotypes is the mechanism through which chronics exert control
over stereotype activation at the short (200-ms) SOA. A negative
priming paradigm was used to examine the hypothesis that the
mechanism through which stereotype activation is controlled is the
preconscious activation of a goal and the subsequent preconscious
inhibition of the stereotype.
Existing Evidence for Control Over Stereotype Activation
In recent years, several experiments (e.g., Blair & Banaji, 1996;
Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Locke, MacLeod, &
Walker, 1994; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, & Castelli, 1997)
have been described as addressing the question of whether Devine's
(1989) failure to find a difference in stereotyping between low- and
high-prejudiced people necessarily provided evidence that stereotype
activation is inevitable. However, Bargh (1999) stated that in pursuing
evidence disproving the postulate of automatic stereotype activation,
researchers in the field have been too quick to embrace existing data
in support of the conclusion (offered by the experiments listed above)
that activation is controllable. For example, Locke et al. (1994) found
differences between low- and high-prejudice persons in responses to
words following stereotype-relevant primes. However, this was not
due to differential responding to stereotype-related words but to
irrelevant words. The interaction between prejudice and word type
that would suggest control over stereotype activation was achieved,
but it was driven by differences along a dimension that does not
address stereotype control. Gilbert and Hixon (1991) similarly stated
that stereotype activation is not automatic, instead asserting that it
requires attentional resources. An implicit measure of activation was
used: word fragment completions. People under cognitive load ex-
posed to a member of a stereotyped group (Asians) failed to show a
stereotypical bias in their word fragment completions. However, the
"stereotypical" traits used in the word fragment completions were not
highly consensual, as only 30% of pretest participants had to agree on
a trait for it to be considered stereotypical of Asians. Thus, the
stereotype of Asians in the community where the research was con-
ducted was weakly held, and this could account for the ability of
divided attention to disrupt activation.
There are other reasons to question whether control over ste-
reotype activation has been adequately demonstrated in the extant
literature. Some experiments leave open the possibility that acti-
vation does occur but is subsequently suppressed in the time
between the stereotype's activation and the experimenter's assess-
ment of activation. For example, Lepore and Brown (1997) sub-
liminally flashed category labels for "Black people" at participants
in a priming task. Low- (vs. high-) prejudice people did not
subsequently use negative stereotypes in characterizing a target.
However, the conclusion from such findings that stereotype acti-
vation is controllable is brought into doubt not only by the fact that
there is concrete evidence that stereotypes, albeit positive stereo-
types, are activated but also by the fact that the experiment does
not allow one to rule out the possibility that negative stereotypes
had been activated. It could be that for low-prejudice people,
negative stereotypes are activated but are weaker than the positive
components of the stereotype (which then overpower activated
negative stereotypes at judgment). Measuring an implicit influence
of a stereotype on a consciously controlled task can provide
evidence of the stereotype's activation (as in Devine, 1989). How-
ever, the absence of such an influence does not need to indicate the
absence of implicit activation; it only needs to indicate the acti-
vated influence failed to carry through to conscious judgments.
Macrae et al. (1997) similarly provided evidence consistent with
the possibility that stereotype activation is controlled, but they
assessed^ctivation after an interval in which conscious processes
could have intervened. An implicit measure of stereotype activa-
tion was used (a lexical decision task) in which responses to
stereotype-relevant words should be facilitated if stereotypes are
activated. However, Macrae et al. never reported the length of the
time interval between the exposure to the priming stimulus and the
lexical decision task. What is reported is that a stimulus was
presented for 255 ms and was followed by a filler task that took
participants in the divided-attention condition, on average, 767 ms
to complete. At this point, more than a second had already elapsed
before the lexical decision task had even begun, and this is not
including the time required to make the lexical decision or the
nonreported times for the interval between the prime and the filler
task and the interval between the filler task and the lexical deci-
sion.
5 In both Lepore and Brown (1997) and Macrae et al., the
primes were presented in ways that allowed for measuring implicit
stereotype activation, but activation was then assessed after con-
scious processing had been initiated, making it impossible to
distinguish between control over stereotype activation and con-
scious suppression of an already activated stereotype.
5 This is particularly add given that Macrae et al. (1997) pointed out that
the reason for using a 255-ms prime-presentation time is because the 1-s
interval used in their previous experiment was allowing too much time to
elapse if one intends to investigate automatic processes. However, the
adjustment to 255 ms still allows for more than 1 s to have elapsed. An
SOA of under 400 ms is useful for assessing automaticity if and only if the
stimuli relevant to the prime are presented immediately after the prime has
disappeared and a response is immediately called for.176 MOSKOWITZ, GOLLWITZER, WASEL. AND SCHAAL
Several other experiments are similar to ours in that the re-
searchers (a) use implicit measures of activation and (b) control for
the possibility that conscious efforts to suppress stereotypes ac-
count for differences between participants (Blair & Banaji, 1996;
Fazio & Dunton, 1997; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). Blair
and Banaji (1996, Experiment 3) examined whether expectancies
could disrupt stereotype activation. Participants were primed by a
trait (either stereotypical, counterstereotypical, or neutral), which
was followed by a name (the task was to classify the name as male
or female). Some participants were told to expect counterstereo-
typical pairings (e.g., ambitious-Betty), others were told to expect
stereotypical pairings. If a stereotype was activated, responses on
the task should have been facilitated (with responses assessed at
speeds where conscious attempts to control responses are not
possible). They found facilitation when participants had stereotyp-
ical expectancies but not when participants had counterstereotypi-
cal expectancies. However, despite this evidence consistent with
the argument for control over stereotype activation, Bargh (1999)
points to difficulties in examining Blair and Banaji's findings. The
responses of the counterstereotypical expectancy group would
ideally be compared with a no-expectancy control group, but these
data were not collected. The participants from this experiment,
however, had participated minutes beforehand in Blair and Ba-
naji's Experiment 1, which used the exact same priming task but
without an expectancy provided. Thus, with the same participants
performing the same task, this could be construed as a control
condition. If results are compared across studies, the participants
were faster with stereotypical pairings when they had a counter-
stereotypical expectancy than when they had no expectancy. Thus,
these results do not provide clear support for the idea that coun-
terstereotypical expectancies controlled stereotype activation.
Finally, Wittenbrink et al. (1997) and Fazio, Jackson, Dunton,
and Williams (1995) have also used reactions to stereotype-
relevant stimuli at speeds where conscious processing cannot
intervene. However, these experiments have been more focused on
attitude assessment as opposed to the demonstration of control
over stereotype activation. In fact, Fazio et al.'s research really
cannot speak to the issue of stereotype activation, as what was
measured were evaluative reactions ("good" vs. "bad" responses)
to positive and negative words that were not related to the stereo-
type.
5 This research addresses the important question of whether
automatic negative evaluations are associated with stereotyped
groups. However, this question is distinct from the question of
whether semantic components of a stereotype (a knowledge struc-
ture) are automatically activated. Fazio et al. described an inter-
esting prejudice-assessment tool; the ability to control negative
evaluations of stereotyped groups at speeds too fast for conscious
control to intervene is certainly a nonreactive way to assess prej-
udicial affect. Although this is not a method for demonstrating
control over stereotype activation, it is potentially a way of iden-
tifying individuals who might subsequently differ in their degree
of stereotype activation.
Similarly, the interesting research of Wittenbrink et al. (1997)
has nothing to do with whether stereotype activation can be con-
trolled. It was concerned with measuring implicit racial attitudes
and examining whether such implicit measures correlate with more
traditional explicit measures (e.g., attitude scales). Their results are
relevant to the current discussion only in that they replicated
Devine's (1989) finding that stereotype activation is implicitly
occurring (while Wittenbrink et al. controlled for the methodolog-
ical criticisms that have been levied against the Devine, 1989,
experiment). However, Wittenbrink et al. did not examine the
question of whether stereotype activation can be controlled or
whether it varies as a function of prejudice levels. (If one wanted
to reanalyze their data by dividing participants along scores on
explicit measures and then examining responses to the implicit
stereotyping task, it would be possible, but this would not be
particularly productive because there was a 2-s interval between
the presentation of the primes and the lexical decision task. As
mentioned above, this would not allow one to draw conclusions
regarding whether the stereotype had first been activated and then
suppressed or whether activation had been controlled to begin
with.)
Preconscious Goals and Implicit Stereotype Inhibition
Thus, since the completion of our Studies 3 and 4 in 1995, there
has been a flurry of activity on the question regarding the inevi-
tability of stereotype activation. The evidence in support of ste-
reotype activation as inevitable has been brought into question, but
so too has evidence stating activation is controllable. In the current
research, like in the past research described above, we attempted to
demonstrate the controllability of activation. However, we did this
from a unique perspective—by examining the goals of being
nonstereotypical and egalitarian (as opposed to targeting expec-
tancies, beliefs, or divided attention). This perspective is unique
not only in that it allows one to posit that goals control activation
but also in that it allows one to posit that the intention to not
stereotype need not consciously operate (recall that past studies
examining goal effects on stereotyping have focused on conscious
processes of debiasing, or correcting, one's thoughts). Intent can
be preconscious so that goals direct processes (such as stereotype
activation) that typically are carried out outside the level of con-
scious awareness (for a discussion of this same issue in the domain
of selective attention, see Moskowitz, in press; Moskowitz &
Sussman, 1999). This begs the question of how one disrupts the
"automatic" links between a category and the cultural stereotypes
that are associated with that category. It is posited that such control
can be exerted through the preconscious inhibition of stereotypic
content.
6 Their research is often characterized as being concerned with stereo-
type activation because Fazio et al. (1995) discussed the notion of auto-
matic stereotype activation to establish their argument that what is acti-
vated automatically is an evaluative response. However, demonstrating the
ability to control the activation of negative affect in no way addresses the
question of whether stereotypes have been activated. Obvious connections
exist, as they both address the issue of what happens automatically on
exposure to a member of a stereotyped group. The possible link from
automatic evaluation to stereotype activation is through an argument raised
by Fazio et al. that if a shared cultural stereotype is activated, all individ-
uals should respond with the same pattern of evaluative responses. This
presupposes that because individuals share a cultural stereotype, they share
the same evaluative reactions to the category as a whole and to the
individual traits that make up the category. This assumption seems unwar-
ranted. It is possible for both the semantic content of a cultural stereotype
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Study 4: When Stereotypes Are Inhibited Rather Than
Activated—A Peek Inside the Motivational Toolbox
The purpose of the following experiment was to establish that
chronic egalitarianism initiates an implicit suppression of the ste-
reotype, thus allowing the individual to control stereotype activa-
tion by inhibiting stereotypical content from coming to mind.
Earlier we argued that control over stereotype activation is not due
to atrophied links to the cultural stereotype, and we based this
conclusion on the fact that chronics and nonchronics were equally
able to report the content of the stereotype. The current experiment
provides further evidence that the links between the category
woman and the stereotype's defining attributes (e.g., weak, depen-
dent, etc.) have not atrophied, demonstrating that chronics do not
simply possess a deteriorated ability to access the stereotype in the
face of a relevant prime. The paradigm chosen to demonstrate
implicit inhibition of the stereotype by chronic egalitarians is one
that is dependent on links between the category and the cultural
stereotype not only existing but being accessed by the individuals
who are inhibiting stereotype activation.
Negative Priming and Stereotype Inhibition
Priming effects are dependent on the assumption that attending
to a stimulus leads to the categorization of the stimulus and the
subsequent activation of semantic content linked to or associated
with the category—spreading activation (e.g., Collins & Loftus,
1975; Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; Neely, 1977; Posner & Sny-
der, 1975). The activation then produces facilitated responses to
material semantically linked to the primed category. However,
does attention always yield spreading activation? Selective atten-
tion, where a particular stimulus is what is focused on in the visual
field, should produce facilitation to semantically linked material
(as could incidental attention to a stimulus in one's visual field).
However, recent research suggests that a process perhaps better
labeled spreading inhibition can be produced by attention, if
attention is focused on ignoring a stimulus and the semantic
content associated with it. Rather than facilitation being found in
responses to words semantically linked to a target, inhibition is
exhibited when words are reacted to more slowly (Neill, Valdes, &
Terry, 1995). If the presence of a prime leads to a slowdown rather
than a facilitation to words linked to the primed category, it
suggests that the individual is ignoring the prime and avoiding
both the category and the contents linked to it. Tipper (1985)
labeled this inhibition effect associated with ignored stimuli neg-
ative priming to contrast the effect with the more typical facilita-
tion effect.
The negative priming effect is said to be dependent on the
stimulus being attended to at some level (perhaps preconsciously)
so that encoding of the stimulus is not interfered with (the stimulus
must be perceived). However, after the to-be-ignored stimulus has
been identified, the mechanism of attention serves to inhibit the
processing of information related to the ignored stimulus. As Fox
(1995) pointed out, this essentially makes the inhibition process
described an extension of late selection (as opposed to early
selection) theories of attention (see Broadbent, 1958; Deutsch &
Deutsch, 1963; Treisman & Geffen, 1967); selecting objects to
attend to (and ignore) occurs only after some initial representation
has been encoded (rather than such information being filtered out
before being categorized, as in early selection). Categorization of
the stimulus is followed by selective attention that is focused on
ignoring the stimulus and inhibiting both the category and the
contents associated with it. In the case of stereotyping, categoriz-
ing a person as having "dark skin" or "female features" or "reli-
gious attire" would occur as a natural part of the preconscious
processes of perception and categorization. However, the semantic
content linked to the category by virtue of cultural stereotypes
(violent or emotional or zealot) could be inhibited as a function of
categorization rather than activated. Such inhibition would be
produced by attempts to ignore and suppress the stereotype.
In a typical negative priming procedure, two prime stimuli are
presented that differ along a dimension (e.g., color of the image,
location on the screen, etc.) on which participants are asked to
discriminate. They are asked to ignore one image (e.g., the one
colored blue) and to attend to the other. As in the Stroop effect
(Stroop, 1935), the instruction to ignore something affects re-
sponses to subsequent targets that are semantically associated with
the ignored material. In negative priming, response latencies are
slower for target stimuli that are related to the to-be-ignored prime
(relative to irrelevant stimuli). In many studies the target is simply
a repeated presentation of the to-be-ignored item. However, the
effect also emerges when the target is a semantic associate of the
ignored prime, demonstrating that semantic meaning is being
inhibited; it is not merely particular responses being interfered
with or particular features being ignored (e.g., Houghton & Tipper,
1994; Tipper, 1985).
We turn next to causes of the effect. Neill et al. (1995) posited
that past responses to a stimulus are stored in episodic memory.
Practice with a particular response (e.g., ignoring) to a particular
stimulus is facilitated over time because the presence of the stim-
ulus can trigger the stored representations of the response without
a new response's needing to be calculated on the spot. This is not
unlike the logic of the auto-motive model (Bargh, 1990), where
goal-directed responses are paired repeatedly with a stimulus and
can, eventually, be facilitated and triggered by the presence of the
stimulus. Given this logic, Neill et al. (1995) suggested that neg-
ative priming is produced in several possible ways. First, a to-be-
ignored prime is categorized, and this implicitly activates prior
responses to that prime stored in episodic memory. If the prior
response tendency conflicts with the current task, the current task
will be slowed down. If one's prior response tendency was to
ignore a stimulus and inhibit its semantic associates and the current
task is to respond to the stimulus (or its semantic associates), then
there is a conflict and the implicit inhibition effect will be evi-
denced by a slowed response time. Second, if there is no prior
response history, the instruction to ignore a stimulus can produce
an inhibition process within the experimental task (as described
above). Finally, if the stimulus is unfamiliar or one that perceivers
have little practice with (as with the stimuli often used in cognitive
psychology), the instruction to ignore a stimulus dictates that the
individual rely on "slow, 'algorithmic' processing to compute the
appropriate response" (Neill et al., 1995, p. 252).
In the case of negative priming and stereotype activation, prac-
tice with the response of ignoring a stereotype when faced with a
member of a stereotyped group should promote the development
of preconscious inhibition of stereotypic content. Being exposed to
a member of a stereotyped group should activate the inhibitory
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to-be-ignored distractor in a negative priming study. In contrast,
practice with the activation of the stereotype when faced with a
member of a stereotyped group should make the very act of
ignoring it and preventing activation extremely difficult and un-
likely, even if it is presented as a to-be-ignored distractor. Thus,
chronics and nonchronics should have a different history of react-
ing to stereotype-relevant targets and their semantic associates.
Chronics have the links to the stereotype from the category but do
not typically activate it; rather, they typically suppress it. For
nonchronics, as in the Stroop effect, it is difficult to ignore seman-
tic content simply by being asked to do so, as they have a history
of activating it. Such individual differences in experience with
responses to stereotype-relevant targets should affect whether the
target can be ignored and its content inhibited in a negative
priming task. Chronics should exhibit negative priming, and non-
chronics should exhibit positive priming.
In Study 4 a paradigm was used in which a prime (a name of
a woman) was ignored, and in turn its semantically associated
attributes were not activated but inhibited. This negative prim-
ing paradigm allowed for a deconfounding of the atrophy ex-
planation for a lack of stereotype activation and our explanation
that posits preconscious control. Negative priming effects can-
not occur if links are not being accessed—the presence of
negative priming requires that links have not atrophied. Thus,
Study 4 extended the findings of Study 3 by focusing on the
mechanisms through which chronic egalitarians control activa-
tion. The implicit inhibition hypothesis posits that chronics
inhibit stereotypical content without activation of the stereo-
type. This inhibition effect should always be stronger for chron-
ics than for nonchronics. Chronics possess the same semantic
associations necessary for inhibition as nonchronics do, but
they additionally possess a goal to be egalitarian, triggered by
relevant environmental stimuli, that initiates inhibition pro-
cesses. If the goal is implicitly activated it leads to an inhibition
process that prevents stereotype activation. Of course, the con-
scious desire to pursue egalitarian goals can also control ste-
reotyping, but it is accomplished through the suppression of a
stereotype after it has been activated (not control over activa-
tion), a point well established in the literature on motivated
correction and effortful suppression of stereotypes (e.g., Devine
et al., 1991; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Gollwitzer & Moskowitz,
1996; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994; Moskowitz
et al., 1996).
To demonstrate stereotype inhibition, we used a reaction time
task. Primes were flashed at an SOA where conscious inhibition
processes could not be occurring. Subsequent to the primes, target
attributes appeared and were to be pronounced as quickly as
possible. The main difference between this exercise and the par-
adigm used in Study 3 was that the primes were words rather than
images; also, two primes were flashed simultaneously on each
trial. On critical trials, rather than attending to the stereotype-
relevant primes, participants were to ignore them and focus atten-
tion on the word paired with it. Additionally, rather than varying
SOA, the focus here was on implicit inhibition effects, and we
chose to examine only responses at an SOA of 200 ms, where such
processes could be addressed. The stereotype investigated was, as
in Study 3, stereotypes toward women.
Method
Participants
Sixty-five male students at the University of Konstanz, selected on the
basis of their chronicity scores from Phase 1, participated in Phase 2 of the
experiment for DM 15 ($10). Five participants' data were subsequently
excluded because of their suspicion about the nature of the experiment,
resulting in a total of 25 chronics and 35 nonchronics.
Design
The experiment was a 2 X 2 X 2 mixed factorial design: The within-
participant variables were (distractor) Primes (stereotype-relevant vs.
stereotype-irrelevant words) X Target Attributes (stereotype-relevant vs.
stereotype-irrelevant attributes). The between-participant variable was
chronicity (chronics vs. nonchronics). The dependent variable was the
response latency on the pronunciation task.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of two phases, identical to those in Study 3. In
the reaction time phase of the experiment, the participants were given 160
regular (and 10 practice) trials. First, a fixation cross was presented in the
middle of the screen for 1,000 ms and was followed by two primes: One
was written in red and the other was in blue. One prime was presented
above the middle of the screen, the other, below (each was 2 cm from the
center). The primes were presented simultaneously for 200 ms. The par-
ticipants were instructed to remember the red one and to ignore the blue
one for a recall test that would occur later. The primes to be recalled were
always gender neutral and written in red. The distractor primes paired with
the recall primes were half gender neutral and half female names, and they
were always written in blue. Immediately following the primes an attribute
(stereotype-relevant or stereotype-irrelevant) was presented that was writ-
ten in black (the background was white for the whole procedure). The
participants had to pronounce the target word as quickly as possible. As
soon as the participants began to pronounce the target word, the attribute
disappeared from the screen. After 2.5 s, a word (written in black) appeared
in the middle of the screen. Half the time the word was the same as the
previously presented recall prime; the rest of the time new, gender-neutral
words were presented. As part of the cover story that described the
experiment as being concerned with recognition memory, participants had
to decide if this stimulus matched the previously presented word in red they
had been asked to recall. If the answer was "yes," they had to push the
button marked Yes; if "no," they had to push the button marked No on the
button box. The intertrial interval was 2 s. The dependent variable was
response latency, which was the time from the presentation of the target
attribute to the beginning of its pronunciation. In addition, the computer
recorded the data for the answers to the match/mismatch question (recog-
nition accuracy).
The first 10 trials were practice trials with stereotype-irrelevant primes.
One hundred sixty trials followed, with 40 critical trials (all had a 200-ms
SOA). On critical trials the manipulations of prime type and target attribute
were arranged such that there were 10 trials associated with each pairing of
the within-participant variables: 10 female name-female attribute pairs, 10
female name-neutral attribute pairs, 10 neutral word—female attribute
pairs, and 10 neutral word—neutral attribute pairs. All 160 trials were
randomized so that prime-attribute pairings differed for each participant.
The location of the to-be-recalled and distractor primes varied randomly as
well; in 50% of the trials the distractor appeared above the center of the
screen, and in 50% of the trials it appeared below.
Chronicity measure. Chronicity was measured exactly as it was in
Study 1.
Primes. The recall primes (gender-neutral words) were objects such as
cane, book, or table. The distractor primes were gender-neutral objects andPRECONSCIOUS CONTROL OF STEREOTYPE ACTIVATION 179
female names like Bettina or Angelika. We selected words that did not
possess any semantic relation to the targets (or to female stereotypes) as
stereotype-irrelevant distractor primes and recall primes.
Target attributes. Ten female attributes and 10 gender-neutral at-
tributes from Study 3 were used.
Apparatus. The apparatus was the same as that used in Study 3. All
letters were approximately 15 mm tall and easily visible for the partici-
pants. Tests indicated that the mean stimulus presentation times were
accurate within 1 ms with a standard deviation of less than 0.1 ms.
Table 5
Response Times (in ms) to Target Attributes Following a
Distractor Prime (Stimulus Onset Asynchrony = 200 ms)
in Experiment 4
Results
Manipulation Checks
Suspicion regarding a contingency between the two experi-
ments. The participants were recruited to participate in two dif-
ferent studies. We asked participants after the second phase of the
experiment if they thought that there was a link between the two
experiments and what they thought the true nature of the experi-
ments could be. Twelve participants were suspicious regarding the
contingency. The suspicions of 5 participants were correct; there-
fore, their data were excluded from the analyses.
Recognition of memorized information. To make sure partic-
ipants had memorized the word written in red, we made the last
part of each trial in the computer experiment a match/mismatch
decision test. In this task, participants had to decide if the last
presented stimulus matched or mismatched the previously pre-
sented word written in red. Only 419 (4.0%) of the 10,400 answers
given (over all participants) were incorrect answers. Chronics did
not differ from nonchronics in their recognition rate, p > .50. All
reaction time data associated with a false match/mismatch decision
were excluded, because we do not know whether these participants
responded incorrectly because they had focused on the distractor
prime.
Outliers. Responses were analyzed for extreme outliers. Re-
action times more or less than 3 standard deviations from the mean
in each category were excluded (overall, 5.6% were excluded, n =
582).
Chronic Fairness Goals and Negative Priming Effects
In this experiment we examined inhibition, which is reflected by
a slower response to stereotype-relevant words but only when
stereotype-relevant primes appear as distractors that are to be
ignored. We predicted a different pattern of results for chronics
and nonchronics, namely, an inhibition pattern for chronics and an
activation pattern for nonchronics (faster responses to stereotype-
relevant words, but only following stereotype-relevant primes). As
predicted, a reliable Prime X Target Attribute X Chronicity inter-
action emerged, F(l, 58) = 10.84, p < .01. The Prime X Target
interaction for nonchronics showed a significant activation pattern,
F(l, 34) = 4.67, p < .04, whereas the Prime X Target interaction
for chronics showed a significant inhibition pattern, F(l,
24) = 12.14, p < .01.
Nonchronics pronounced female attributes more quickly follow-
ing female primes (M = 757 ms) than following gender-neutral
primes (M = 783 ms), r(34) = -2.50, p < .02, but did not differ
in their speed when pronouncing gender-neutral attributes follow-
ing female versus neutral primes, t(34) = 0.92, p = .36 (see Table
5). This is consistent with the evidence from Study 3 demonstrat-
Attribute type
Stereotypical
Irrelevant
Stereotypical
Irrelevant
Negative
Stereotypical
Nonchronic participants
747
773
Chronic participants
770
757
prime type
Irrelevant
783
765
748
768
ing that nonchronics have stereotypes implicitly activated. Chron-
ics, however, reveal an opposite pattern. Female attributes were
pronounced more slowly following female primes (M = 770 ms)
than following neutral primes (M = 748 ms), 7(24) = 3.11, p <
.01. However, chronics did not reliably differ in their speed when
pronouncing neutral attributes following female versus neutral
primes, f(24) = -1.57, p = .3 (see Table 5). Given that this
slowdown occurs at an SOA where conscious processes of inhi-
bition are not possible, the data reveal an implicit inhibition and
preconscious control over stereotype activation due to implicitly
primed chronic goals.
Discussion
This experiment was concerned with inhibition processes oc-
curring at the activation phase of information processing. Study 3
showed that chronics control stereotype activation. The current
study showed there was a preconscious inhibition of stereotypical
content for chronics but not for nonchronics. This can account for
the finding of Study 3, replicated here, that stereotype activation is
controlled by chronic egalitarians. Instructions to ignore a
stereotype-relevant cue led to implicit inhibition of information
associated with that cue. The passive inhibition effect demon-
strated here was produced using a negative priming procedure, a
technique new to research on stereotype activation, and suggests
that stereotype control in chronic egalitarians occurs because of
preconsciously activated goals. Control for chromes was based on
motivational processes and was not produced by an atrophy in the
links between cognitive structures. The existence of negative prim-
ing effects supports the interpretation that chronics have the same
cognitive representation and structure of the stereotype but differ
in their goals. Implicitly activated egalitarian goals allow chronics
not merely to prevent stereotypes from being activated but to
inhibit the stereotype prior to activation.
General Discussion
The Passive Operation of Goals
Chronics were not facilitated in their responses to stereotype-
relevant words following stereotype-relevant primes (vs. stereotype-
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quickly for conscious control. Experiment 4 found not only no facil-
itation for chronics, but inhibition of the stereotype. Nonchronics, in
contrast, revealed activation of the stereotype; there was facilitation in
responding to stereotype-relevant words (but not stereotype-irrelevant
words) following stereotype-relevant (but not stereotype-irrelevant)
primes. These results demonstrate that control over stereotype activa-
tion is being exerted by chronics; the failure to use stereotypes cannot
be due to an effortful process of correcting or debiasing one's judg-
ments (e.g., Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Neuberg, 1989; Wegener &
Petty, 1995). This would suggest a change in how terms such as
intended and deliberate are used in the literature, so that they are not
equated with consciousness; one can exert the will in an intentional
fashion but without effortful processing. Deliberate and volitional
control can be applied preconsciously, exerting effects at the level of
categorization and construct activation.
In support of this logic, Moskowitz and Sussman (1999) have
found that activated goals lead to perceptual sensitization, so that
goal-relevant words capture and direct attention at speeds where
conscious control over attention cannot operate. Goals were con-
trolling implicit cognitive responses. An implication of this find-
ing, as well as the findings of the current research, for stereotyping
is that the intent to be nonstereotypic need not be described as the
"hard choice" that one consciously and effortfully uses to over-
come the impact exerted on judgments by the "easy choice" of
stereotype activation and use (Fiske, 1989). Intent to be nonste-
reotypic can also be the dominant or easy choice so that it, and not
the stereotype, operates passively. Cognitive control contributes
not only to the correction of judgments but to their construction as
well (e.g., Jacoby, Kelley, & McElree, 1999; Moskowitz, Skurnik,
& Galinsky, 1999; Moskowitz & Skurnik, 1999).
We adopt Lewin's (1936) belief that "a goal can play an essen-
tial role in the psychological situation without being clearly
present in consciousness" (p. 19). This is possible because of the
implicit activation of the goal by an environmental cue, an acti-
vation made possible by the links that develop between the goal
construct and relevant environmental cues as the goal becomes
chronically held. However, how could such automatic construct-
stimulus links develop? The case that we have examined is that in
which chronic goals are measured as an individual difference,
differentiating between people in their level of commitment to
egalitarianism. According to the auto-motives model (Bargh,
1990), such differences would develop through the habitual pursuit
of a goal, thus establishing strong links between the goal construct
and relevant environmental cues. This model would suggest that in
addition to inhibiting stereotypical content, chronics should have
the goal construct activated by the presence of a stereotype-
relevant prime. Indeed, Moskowitz, Salomon, and Taylor (in
press) have provided evidence demonstrating that chronics (rela-
tive to nonchronics) are facilitated in their responses to words
related to egalitarianism, but only after experiencing stereotype-
relevant primes (and at an SOA where conscious intent could not
have been activated).
This focus on individual differences in commitment to egalitar-
ian goals as a means to control stereotype activation might lead to
the inference that we advocate a return to a personality approach to
prejudice. However, we do not suggest that the task when attempt-
ing to control stereotyping and prejudice is simply one of labeling
bigoted versus tolerant people. Our point is that commitment to a
goal can lead to preconscious control. We began exploring this
issue by focusing on individual differences, but such control,
theoretically, need not be limited to an individual difference ap-
proach. One can instantiate commitment to temporary goals in
people without chronic differences related to goal pursuit. If tem-
porary goals are linked to environmental cues, the strength of the
association that is established between such cues and the goal can
determine whether the goal is passively activated. Thus, even if a
goal construct is not chronic, its activation could be surrendered to
relevant environmental cues if a strong enough link was estab-
lished. The goal could then direct attention and behavior unmedi-
ated by consciousness.
This logic is reflected in Lewin's (1936) account of how inten-
tions direct behavior and Gollwitzer and Moskowitz's (1996)
notion of implementation intentions as a source of commitment.
Gollwitzer and Moskowitz defined such intentions as specific
plans of action for attaining a goal to which the individual is
committed. This connects the goal to a situational context. In this
way, intent that is not chronic but is furnished with commitment
(thus linking a course of action and a context) has the activation of
the intent passed to the context and relevant cues (that activate the
goal directly) without any further conscious intent by the individ-
ual (Gollwitzer, 1993). A result would be that any person who
chooses to reject a stereotype, not just chronically tolerant people,
could control stereotype activation if their goals were enforced
through plans and committed intentions (e.g., Gollwitzer, Schaal,
Moskowitz, Hammelbeck, & Wasel, 1999; Moskowitz, in press).
On the Inevitability of Stereotype Activation
We have already reviewed recent social-cognitive evidence that
prejudice level (beliefs and attitudes), expectancies, and disrupted
attention can interfere with the accessibility of stereotype-related
content (e.g., Blair & Banaji, 1996; Lepore & Brown, 1997).
Proposals from a variety of other perspectives suggest that stereo-
type activation need not be construed as an inevitable event caused
by the mere presence of a member of a stereotyped group. This
includes our approach, which focuses on the role in this process of
preconsciously operating goals and commitment. For example, the
motivational perspective outlined herein predicts that passive ste-
reotype control is dependent on the strength of the link between the
adopted goal intention and the contextual cue. This focuses atten-
tion on the fact that not only the commitment to the goal but the
nature of the cue should affect whether the goal is implicitly
activated and, in turn, whether the stereotype is activated. As Sagar
and Schofield (1980) noted:
A category, though accessible, will be elicited only by relevant
perceptual events. This raises the possibility that the violent-black
stereotype may bias trait attributions to persons who engage in
stereotype-relevant behavior without influencing responses to those
who do not.... A clearly nonaggressing black may not be considered
any more aggressive than his or her white counterpart because nothing
in his or her behavior brings the violent-black stereotype to mind,
(p. 592)
Thus, an African American professor might activate one's seman-
tic constructs, such as intellectual, woman, African American, or
social awkwardness. This individual might also activate one's goal
constructs, such as achievement, egalitarianism, or competitive-
ness (see Moskowitz et al., in press). The strength of the linkPRECONSCIOUS CONTROL OF STEREOTYPE ACTIVATION 181
between the cue and these various constructs would affect what is
activated and how the person is categorized. Not all cues should be
expected to activate the stereotype, as the link to an alternative
representation may be more dominant (see McArthur & Baron's,
1983, discussion of affordances). Similarly, not all cues should be
expected to activate the goal construct as activation is dependent
on the links developed between the stimulus and one's goals (see
Lewin's, 1936, discussion of valence). Gilbert and Hixon (1991)
raised this issue when pointing out the distinction between repre-
senting a member of a stereotyped group through a verbal label
(the words Black man) or through a picture or interaction. When
we observe people (rather than read about them), there does not
need to be activation of the stereotype for each of the many groups
to which they belong. However, such activation might be hard to
avoid when presented with a verbal label explicitly mentioning one
of those groups.
7
There are reasons to posit that stereotype activation is control-
lable other than the fact that some types of stimuli, such as
linguistic labels, promote activation, whereas other stimuli do not.
Logan (1989) found that with practice, a process once considered
automatic (the Stroop effect) can be controlled. Similarly, Wegner
(1994) showed that inhibitory processes can be overlearned and
automatized. Skurnik and Moskowitz (1999) found that the so-
called automatic tendency to encode all statements as true (and
only subsequently and with cognitive effort correct this with a
false label for false information) could be interfered with and
controlled through practice. Bargh (1994, 1997) asserted that au-
tomaticity and control need not be conceived of as opposing poles
but can run separately (see also Moskowitz et al., 1999). Thus,
practice with and the habitualization of nonstereotypical responses
(such as forming counterstereotypical expectancies, as suggested
by Blair & Banaji, 1996) should be another successful procedure
for controlling stereotype activation.
On the Nature of Stereotype Control
For over a decade, psychologists have focused on the control
and suppression of stereotype use. Several strategies for inhibiting
stereotype use have been examined:
1. providing clear and diagnostic counterstereotypical behavior
from a member of a stereotyped group that forces perceivers to
individuate and attend to stereotype-inconsistent information (e.g.,
Locksley, Borgida, Brekke, & Hepburn, 1980; Moskowitz, 1996),
2. providing goals (e.g., Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Jones &
Thibaut, 1958; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Tetlock, 1985) that
serve to similarly promote a movement away from heuristic infor-
mation processing to systematic evaluations of members of ste-
reotyped groups, and
3. instructing individuals to suppress stereotypic thoughts (e.g.,
Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998; Macrae, Bodenhausen, et al.,
1994). These strategies suggest that control is exerted through
effortful processing and the intention to curb one's use of stereo-
types after stereotypes have been activated. Our data are not
inconsistent with this notion that goals can lead to the effortful
debiasing of judgments after the passive activation of a stereotype.
Even nonchronics should be able to control stereotyping if they
have a goal that promotes elaborate processing. However, our data
further demonstrate that stereotype activation can be controlled
through goals. This means that we can move beyond the notion of
control as a process of dissociation. Volition may play a role at
both the conscious and the preconscious levels, preventing stereo-
type activation.
Why is it that these conclusions differ from Devine (1989)?
Prejudice level in that research was assessed through a beliefs
scale, and perhaps such measures do not adequately assess com-
mitment to egalitarian and nonprejudiced goals. Thus, even De-
vine's participants who claimed to be low in prejudice were,
interestingly, shown to have had their stereotypes activated. These
people have apparently learned socially transmitted information
(the stereotype) and could very well reject those stereotypical
beliefs, yet they may not be committed enough to, or have had
enough time to, habitualize that rejection. Thus, although there is
clearly a class of people whom we can classify as bigots, the
discussion here concerns people who are not bigoted. Nonbigots
are those who reject stereotypes, and it is suggested that they fall
into several categories. They may range from those who cannot
prevent stereotype activation despite rejecting stereotypical beliefs
(but can correct for their use of stereotypes in later judgments) to
those who habitualize rejection and fail to have stereotypes acti-
vated. For the former, stereotype use is the easy choice; for the
latter, chronic fairness goals are dominant. This extension of the
dissociation model is important because it suggests ways to control
stereotype use that are not subject to some of the limitations of the
debiasing (or dissociation) strategy. Debiasing fails if the process-
ing system is taxed. It also fails if one is unaware of one's biases
and, thus, unmotivated to correct them. Rationalizations and avoid-
ance strategies help people maintain such unawareness so that they
do not need to face their biases and deal with the compunction and
guilt such awareness would invoke (see Airport's, 1954, discussion
of inner conflict).
8 Additionally, even when a conscious attempt to
suppress a stereotype succeeds, it can lead to rebound effects so
that stereotypes are used in subsequent judgments (e.g., Macrae,
Bodenhausen, et al., 1994).
Conclusion
In stating that stereotype activation can be controlled, we do not
wish to undermine the position that stereotypes can be activated
and operate outside of awareness, that this happens with great
efficiency and without conscious intent to activate or use them.
Stereotypes are pervasive, passive, and functional (see, e.g., Mac-
rae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). This, however, does not mean
that activation is beyond control. Activation of stereotypes can be
7 As Gilbert and Hixon (1991) stated, "The Sufis teach that 'If a
pickpocket meets a holy man, he will see only his pockets'" (p. 511) but
"when a pickpocket reads the words holy man, he will probably think of a
great deal more than pockets—and in so doing, he will reveal little about
how pickpockets construe holy men in their day-to-day lives" (516).
8 People often are not aware they use stereotypes, making stereotypes
difficult to control (Hepburn & Locksley, 1983). This can create a sense
that stereotyping is not really something that perceivers need to worry
about in their personal dealings: They need not attempt to correct or adjust
their judgments because they are not aware that they are influenced by
stereotypes (e.g., McConahay & Hough, 1976). It allows perceivers to
relegate stereotyping to the domain of an imagined "group of racists" rather
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controlled by more dominant responses, in this case, egalitarian
goals. However, this requires commitment to such a goal, and
without commitment, stereotype activation will be likely to occur.
In discussing stereotype control, Macrae, Bodenhausen, and
Milne (1995) suggested that people, as targets of perception, are
multifaceted and complex. Many conceptions of others may be
activated when categorizing, and as Allport (1954, p. 21) stated,
the dominant social category will be what is used. This may be the
stereotype, but for people with chronic egalitarian goals, the goal
may be what is dominant, and it could win this metaphorical,
preconscious race to capture the stimulus. Stereotypes are habits
that develop by reaching too often into the cognitive toolbox to
ease the task of impression formation. They can, however, be
broken by using motivation to direct the perceiver to find his or her
tools elsewhere. Commitment to egalitarian goals can prevent
stereotype activation when making inferences from social
information.
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